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In 1995, Congress enacted a ban on federal funding for experimentation with
human embryos.1 In 2001, President George W. Bush issued a presidential policy
statement extending this funding ban to research on human stem cells extracted
from embryos except for research on a limited number of cell lines that had
previously been established; 2 he reiterated this position in a 2007 executive
order.3 In his 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama promised to support
stem cell research.4 It now seems likely that in addition to rescinding Bush's
executive order,5 Obama will ask Congress to repeal its funding ban from 1995,
which still prohibits scientists from generating new stem cell lines.
6
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1. Known as the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, this ban was formally a rider to federal
appropriations for Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education; it has been renewed every
year since 1996. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99 § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34
(1996); see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, New Stem Cell Policy To Leave Thorniest Issue to Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, at Al.
2. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, President Discusses Stem Cell
Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2001/08/20010809-2.html.
3. Exec. Order No. 13,435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34,591 (June 22, 2007).
4. See, e.g., Barack Obama & Joe Biden, The Change We Need, Technology,
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/technology/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
5. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009); see also White House Press
Office, Fact Sheet on Presidential Executive Order: Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific
Research Involving Human Stem Cells, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/
Fact-Sheet-on-Presidential-Executive-Order (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
6. See Stolberg, supra note 1; CNN, CNN's John King Interviews President-Elect Barack
Obama, Jan. 16, 2009, http://news.turner.com/article-display.cfn?articleid=4209 ("Well, if we
can do something legislative then I usually prefer a legislative process because those are the
people's representatives. And I think that on embryonic stem cell research, the fact that you have a
bipartisan support around that issue... I think that sends a powerful message .... I like the idea of
the American people's representatives expressing their views on an issue like this.").
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The politics surrounding this research could shift again-as the ethical issues
of stem cell research are reopened, some critics may promote a total prohibition
of human embryonic and stem cell research. Public debate on this issue has thus
far focused on policy concerns. The purpose of this Article is to explore
constitutional arguments that might be invoked to overturn any federal or state
restrictions on human embryonic stem cell research.
Broadly speaking, I will evaluate four different constitutional challenges to a
total ban: 1) that such regulations violate researchers' constitutional right of free
scientific inquiry; 2) that such regulations violate individual rights to
reproductive freedom; 3) that the former Executive Branch restriction imposed an
unconstitutional condition on the availability of government funding; and 4) that
neither reproductive nor therapeutic cloning is a permissible subject for
congressional enactment, but that both are reserved exclusively for state
regulatory authority. Exhaustively evaluating these four possible constitutional
objections would require writing at least a small textbook on constitutional law; I
will instead be suggestive rather than exhaustive.
I. THE RIGHT OF FREE SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
The First Amendment proscription that Congress "shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech" 7 might seem an obvious haven for scientific
researchers committed to intellectual inquiry into the basic workings of the
human organism. On at least a few occasions, the Supreme Court has clearly
asserted that freedom of speech applies not just to expression but also to teaching
and intellectual inquiry that could lead to expression.8 In its most expansive
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 567 (1969) (striking down a Georgia law
forbidding the possession of obscene material, noting that the "right to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth .... is fundamental to our free society," and that "the State
may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to
antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may
lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits"); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591-92,
603 (1967) (considering a First Amendment challenge to a New York law requiring teachers to
answer questions about membership in the Communist Party); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 236, 250 (1957) (plurality decision holding that a professor's academic freedom is
infringed when he is compelled to answer questions about a lecture dealing with communism). But
see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1965) (upholding restrictions on citizen travel to Cuba
despite a citizen's stated purpose of gathering information about Cuban life and noting that "[t]he
fight to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information");
Steve Keane, The Case Against Blanket First Amendment Protection of Scientific Research:
Articulating a More Limited Scope of Protection, 59 STAN. L. REv. 505, 528-531 (2006) (rejecting
the theory that scientific research should receive First Amendment protection simply because it is a
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embrace of this ideal, the Court in 1967 extolled free academic inquiry as a
"transcendent value" forbidding "laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom." 9 Similarly, in 1957 the Court stated as follows:
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made....
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die.' 0
It is a seemingly easy step to apply these encomia to the pursuit of scientific
knowledge in research laboratories, and it is a tempting step beyond that to assert
that the current or proposed restrictions on reproductive and research cloning are
nothing more than a (forbidden) "pall of orthodoxy" over free-ranging scientific
inquiry.
The constitutional argument is, however, not so easy to sustain. The courts
have in fact been very sparing in giving any enforceable content to these high-
flown dicta." Consider the cases in which individual researchers have claimed
that state university officials "cast a pall of orthodoxy" over their free scientific
inquiry by dismissing them from employment or removing them from classroom
teaching based on the content of their expressed views.12 The First Amendment
"precondition" of speech). The Court has also acknowledged the right of the organized press to
"gather news." See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)
(overturning a Massachusetts law excluding the press from court during testimony of minor sex
victims); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that an order
closing a criminal trial infringed the First Amendment right to attend criminal trials); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated."). See generally Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or
Other "Abridgements" of Scientific Research: The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the
First Amendment, 54 EMORY L.J. 979, 1053-54 (2005) (using different modes of constitutional
reasoning to assess how the First Amendment may protect scientific inquiry, and noting that press-
oriented cases may not apply to the gathering of information through scientific inquiry because
much scientific research is performed without publication as a primary goal).
9. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
10. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
11. See generally J. Peter Byme, Academic Freedom: "A Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 255 (1989) (arguing that "constitutional academic freedom should
primarily insulate the university in core academic affairs from interference by the state").
12. See, e.g., Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding summary
judgment where a university stripped a professor of privileges when he refused to submit grading
materials and finding that "[n]o person has a fundamental right to teach undergraduate engineering
classes without following the university's grading rules"); Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800 (6th
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would clearly be violated if state officials removed political candidates from the
ballot based on substantive objections to the content of their campaign literature,
but substantive review by tenure committees in state (as well as private)
universities is a well-accepted method of scientific quality control. The First
Amendment thus cannot be applied with the same free-ranging breadth in
academic or scientific pursuits as in other social endeavors. Moreover, the courts
have not been particularly searching or welcoming in any effort to translate this
supposed "transcendent value" of free academic inquiry into a coherent and
enforceable protection.
A different tack for future doctrinal development might be imagined.
Freedom of intellectual inquiry might be conceived not as an individual
researcher's right, but as a right of the scientific or academic community-a right
based on a recognition of the special characteristic of "scientific truth" as based
on communal standards of scientific self-regulation. This conception of scientific
truth would be transgressed by restrictions imposed by government officials
guided by non-scientific criteria. This formulation would, however, run up
against some considerable difficulties of application. Officials clearly have
authority to refuse funds for scientific research based on the decidedly non-
scientific criterion that other demands on government resources should have
higher priority; this difficulty might be addressed, however, by specially
permissive rules for restrictions on government funding.'
3
With this proviso, a challenge might be launched against the proposed ban
on all (not just federally funded) research or reproductive cloning based on non-
scientific criteria about denigrating the "human status" of the cloned organism.
But here too the principled basis for such challenge immediately becomes
cloudy. For reproductive cloning, there is a respectable body of scientific
literature suggesting that there may be substantial (or at least unknown) risks for
the long-range health status of the cloned person.14 This basis for prohibiting
Cir. 2001) (upholding a teacher's suspension for using offensive language in class when it was not
germane to the subject matter and citing similar cases from other jurisdictions); Urofsky v.
Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding a state statute restricting the ability of state
employees to access sexually explicit material as applied to public university professors and
characterizing academic freedom as inhering in universities, not in individual professors); Edwards
v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3rd Cir. 1998) (finding that the First Amendment does not
grant the professor the right to select curriculum materials that contravened university policy and
noting that "a public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what
will be taught in the classroom"). But see Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th
Cir. 2001) (finding that refusal to renew a teaching contract based on in-class speech could violate
the First Amendment and noting that "a teacher's in-class speech deserves constitutional
protection").
13. See infra Part III.
14. See generally IRVING L. WEISSMAN, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN
IX:2 (2009)
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reproductive cloning might appear well within "scientific criteria." But is it clear
that other objections to reproductive cloning, based on humanistic values such as
respect for individuality, should be barred from public protection? Is it clear that
professional exponents of "science" should be given exclusive social authority
for deciding our collective futures? To assert that only "scientific" criteria might
guide social regulation is to beg the ultimate question at issue: what is the proper
role of science and scientists in shaping the values of our shared social life?
The First Amendment, in its commitment to wide-open, robust inquiry, does
not answer this question; it demands that the answer be openly and endlessly
debated. Scientists cannot, therefore, claim its protection on the basis that their
self-regulated community is the sole repository of "truth" about any contestable
issue regarding our social life; that claim, in itself, is antithetical to the
underlying value of the First Amendment of free speech and inquiry.
II. THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
Publicly enacted bans on cloning might be challenged not by their scientific
purveyors but by individuals who want to use the technology, whether to
reproduce an entire human being or only to produce human embryos by cloning
their own cells. This claim could be based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade 15 and the line of cases endorsing a constitutional right of "privacy"
or "liberty" in controlling one's own reproductive capacities., 6 The principle
derived from the abortion cases could clearly apply to an individual's choice to
give birth to a child whether the child is conceived by cloning, in vitro
fertilization or some other methodology. The Roe principle could also support the
right to refrain from having a child-not just by contraception or abortion, but
through other techniques for interrupting fetal development, such as destroying
the embryo for research purposes.
Given the way the Supreme Court has developed the Roe doctrine in recent
years, however, it seems most likely that none of the proposed congressional
restrictions on reproductive cloning would be invalidated on individual "privacy"
or "liberty" grounds. In 1992, the Court reinterpreted Roe by ruling that states
were not entirely prohibited from restricting an individual's right to reproductive
choice, but instead that states were prohibited only from imposing an "undue
REPRODUCTIVE CLONING (2002).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (enforcing strict scrutiny for review of the classifications used in state sterilization laws
because of the "basic liberty" being deprived).
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burden." 7 The distinction between impermissible "undue" and permitted "due"
burdens is not exactly pellucid in the Court's formulary. It seems likely,
however, that prohibition of reproductive cloning in order to protect the health of
the cloned child would pass muster under this cloudy standard, whether the
health risk is understood as physical or psychological. Even before narrowing its
interpretation of Roe, the Court had endorsed restrictions on access to drugs to
protect all potential users from health risks, although some individuals wanted to
forego this protection.'1 8 Similarly, the Court has subsequently upheld prohibition
of physician-assisted suicide even for terminally ill individuals who wanted this
course for themselves. 19 If the Court has been willing to uphold restrictions on
choices in order to protect individuals from health risks they would themselves
accept, there would be no basis for overturning state prohibitions against one
individual's inflicting health risks on another (namely, the embryo potentially
able to develop into a viable human being) who had expressed no choice in the
matter.
In contrast to reproductive cloning, a person's claim for the right to use her
cells for research or therapeutic cloning would face a different obstacle. A state
prohibition preventing one from using her cells for therapeutic purposes does not
seem to present an "undue" burden on the donor because the state is not forcing
her to use her body in ways she does not want to (as it does in the case of
abortion bans). Instead, prohibition of research or therapeutic cloning might be
understood as a restriction on an individual's liberty to do what she pleases with
any part of her body, but it is not clear that Roe itself endorsed this libertarian
premise. (Consider, for example, laws restricting prostitution or drug use, which
narrow the claimed liberties on individuals' use of their bodies.) Understanding
Roe as more concerned with "privacy" than with "liberty" provides a justification
for prohibitions against research or therapeutic cloning, which, unlike forcing
continuation of pregnancy, regulate events entirely outside the body of the
individual cell donor. Roe itself, moreover, accepted state regulation of abortion
after the fetus was capable of survival outside the mother's body-after the
moment of "viability" 2 0-and state regulation of the disposition of the viable
17. Casey, 505 U.S. at 16.
18. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (upholding the FDA's proscription of
Laetrile for cancer treatment). The D.C. Circuit recently made a similar holding denying terminally
ill cancer patients access to experimental medications that have not been FDA-approved. Abigail
Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1069 (2008).
19. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest
in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal
life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.").
IX:2 (2009)
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cloned cell would find justification here.
1II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF GOVERNMENT
FUNDING
With Congressional restrictions still in force at this time,21 the use of federal
funds for reproductive or research cloning outside specific circumstances remains
forbidden. If government funding were equated with private philanthropy, it
would be difficult to imagine a basis for challenging the government's decision
to spend its funds for some purposes but not for others, as it saw fit. In our
constitutional scheme, however, the government has obligations that private
philanthropists do not; the government is obliged to honor public norms of
behavior that private parties are free to avoid. Thus, for example, the Constitution
forbids the government from giving funds only to Catholics but not to other
religious groups,22 whereas private parties are free to indulge religious
preferences (and, indeed, are constitutionally protected in acting on such
preferences under the First Amendment).
Nonetheless, a constitutional argument against federal funding restrictions
on cloning for reproductive or research purposes would be unlikely to succeed.
The funding restriction cannot be opposed on the ground that potential recipients
have an independent constitutional right to engage in cloning; for the reasons
already outlined here, it is difficult to see the basis for claiming such a right.
Even if there were a constitutional right against government prohibition of
cloning, it still would not follow that the federal or state governments are obliged
to provide funds for carrying out these activities.
The Supreme Court has clearly set its face against such a ruling in a series of
cases where state and federal legislatures forbade the use of public funds in
carrying out abortions, or even simply prohibited the funded agency from
counseling women about the possibility of obtaining an abortion.23 These
21. See supra note 1.
22. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that to avoid infringing the
Establishment Clause, state statutes must have a secular legislative purpose, must not have the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and must not foster excessive entanglement with
religion); see also Jane Lampman, Obama Would Overhaul Bush's Faith-Based Initiatives,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jul. 2, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0702/p25s10-uspo.html
(noting that some watchdog groups have won lawsuits when faith-based groups have used federal
funding for religious purposes and describing the restrictions Obama recommends for federal
dollars given to faith-based groups).
23. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding congressional prohibition
against physicians employed by federally funded agencies from informing women about abortion
services); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding congressional denial of federal
Medicaid funds for abortions, even for maternal health protection); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
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funding restrictions obviously made it more difficult for pregnant women to
obtain abortions, but the Court has ruled that public agencies are not obliged to
financially subsidize or to provide any measure of support for abortions, even
though the agencies may not constitutionally prohibit any woman from obtaining
an abortion. If, as I have suggested, governmental restriction of cloning for
reproductive or research purposes is not constitutionally prohibited, it is difficult
to see the basis for any constitutional challenge to refusal of public funding
restrictions for such cloning.
IV. CLONING MAY BE REGULATED ONLY BY STATES AND NOT BY CONGRESS
Just a few years ago, it would have been difficult to imagine a successful
argument that states possess exclusive constitutional authority to regulate
cloning. Two bases for congressional regulatory authority would have seemed
available. One basis could have been found in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. This section provides that "Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the Amendment,
24 thincluding its guarantee of equal protection of the laws. In the 1960s, as
Congress sought to extend protections against state-supported race and sex
discrimination, the Court construed Section 5 authority to permit broader
congressional conceptions of equal protection than the Court alone might have
been willing to endorse without statutory expansion.25 By this construction,
Congress could readily have justified a conclusion that reproductive cloning
harmed the resulting person and thereby infringed his right to equal protection of
the laws. Similarly, Congress could have asserted that a cloned embryo was
sufficiently endowed with human characteristics that its use for research cloning
violated the equal protection guarantee. But this expansive conception of the
scope of Congress' Section 5 authority has effectively vanished from the current
Court's jurisprudence.26
In particular, the Court's recent decision in United States v. Morrison27 has
removed any possibility of constitutional authority for congressional regulation
of cloning under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), Congress had provided a federal court remedy for
(1977) (upholding state denial of Medicaid benefits for abortion while covering childbirth
expenses).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
25. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
26. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003) (arguing that the Court's
recent Section 5 jurisprudence breaks from decades of deference and reflects an aggressive vision
of a "juricentric" Constitution).
27. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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gender-motivated violence by private actors partly on the ground that state laws
in many jurisdictions were inadequate to protect women's safety.2 8 The Morrison
Court ruled, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to "state
action" and not to private conduct, rejecting the congressional rationale that state
failure to provide adequate protection against violence to women was, in itself,
an adequate basis for finding an equal protection violation by states. By the
Court's narrow construction of requisite state action, it is not possible to see how
Congress could justify any ban of reproductive or research cloning unless the
activity were directly conducted in state-run laboratories. Following Morrison,
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides no authority for congressional
regulation of cloning.
The second possible basis for federal regulation of cloning-seemingly even
clearer than its Section 5 authority-would have been congressional authority to
regulate interstate commerce, as authorized by Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution. Prior to the 1930s, the Supreme Court had narrowly construed this
authority to exclude such matters as child labor or coal mining from
congressional regulatory authority, even though such activities had clear
connections with and substantial impact on interstate commercial activity. 29 The
Great Depression and the activist interventions of the New Deal led the Court to
abandon its restrictive interpretation of the federal commerce authority and, over
the next sixty years, to validate federal regulatory actions with even the most
tenuous demonstrable connection with interstate commerce. 30 At the same time,
the increasingly complex integration of national economic activity apparently
provided a constitutionally sufficient link with interstate commerce for virtually
any conceivable federal regulation. If the post-New Deal permissive
interpretation still held, finding a requisite connection with interstate commerce
to justify federal regulation of reproductive or therapeutic cloning would be a
foregone conclusion. A sufficient case would arise simply from the economic
competition among laboratories in various states to develop the latest cloning
techniques and employ the most innovative research scientists-not to mention
the interstate transportation of paraphernalia for the cloning activity itself. But
the post-New Deal permissiveness is increasingly under challenge by the
contemporary Supreme Court.
28. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902, 1941-42 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)).
29. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
30. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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The Court's recent decision in Morrison appears to undermine any
Commerce Clause justification for federal regulatory authority over cloning. In
striking down the provision of a federal cause of action for violence against
women, Morrison dismissed extensive congressional findings that violence
against women had substantial impact on interstate commerce because of
women's lost hours of employment and increased medical expenses. The Court
held that the commerce clause only justified federal regulation of activity which
was "economic in nature" rather than "noneconomic ... conduct [with an] ...
aggregate effect on interstate commerce."
31
Determining whether cloning is "economic" or "non-economic in nature" is
surely a snark hunt, but beneath this foggy concept, the Court appears intent on
drawing a constitutional "distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local."3 2 Though this "truth" is scarcely less self-evident than the distinction
between economic and non-economic conduct, the Court's examples of the "truly
local"-that is, "marriage, divorce, and childrearing" 33-strongly suggest that
regulation of cloning would fall on the "truly local" side of the Court's
delineation of constitutional authority. Prohibition of reproductive cloning is
clearly nothing more than identification of an impermissible technique of
"childrearing"; and the destruction of embryos involved in cloning research is
based on the progenitor's decision to refrain from childrearing-that is, from
carrying embryos to term. There may be other rationales for congressional
restrictions-for example, to protect nationwide threats to "the sanctity of
embryonic life." But if the Court is intent on constructing a protected area of
state hegemony over "non-economic activity" and if childrearing is one defining
characteristic of this hegemonic realm, the Court will ignore other
characterizations of cloning just as it ignored the economic consequences of
gender-based violence in its eagerness to give narrow definition to congressional
Commerce Clause authority.
The Court's rediscovery of the constitutional imperative to protect state
regulatory autonomy against federal encroachment has thus far been applied to
strike down congressional enactments of a liberal stripe; in addition to the
Violence Against Women Act, the Court has invoked state-autonomy concerns to
overturn federal laws restricting gun possession near school premises 34 and
federal protections against age or disability-based discriminations in state
government employment. 3
In its most recent decision, a Court majority appeared to pull back from this
31. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 617.
32. Id. at 617-18.
33. Id. at 616.
34. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
35. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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enterprise of constraining congressional authority. In Gonzales v. Raich,36
upholding congressional preemption of state laws that permitted the "medical
use" of marijuana, the Court insisted that the new state-autonomy cases were
limited exceptions that must be read in "the larger context of modem-era
Commerce Clause jurisprudence preserved by these cases." 37 Three Justices,
however, strenuously dissented from this ruling. The question of the existence
and reach of a resuscitated state-autonomy principle thus remains open to
dispute.
If, notwithstanding the contrary indication of Gonzales v. Raich, the Court
persists in refurbishing state autonomy limitations on congressional power, that
principle must be sauce for right-wing geese as well as left-wing ganders. If any
future Congress were to enact cloning restrictions, the Court should apply its
new-found respect for state autonomy with evenhanded consistency. In my view,
virtue as well as consistency would support this application. As fuzzy as the line
might be for distinguishing the "truly national" from the "truly local" or
"economic" conduct from "non-economic" conduct, it is important to protect
institutional structures for public deliberation about deeply contentious moral
convictions that promote respect for diversity of views and ensure that none of
the combatants in these divisive issues can be easily silenced. The moral values
at stake in deliberating an issue such as the propriety of reproductive or research
cloning are complex and incommensurate. Conclusive resolution of this issue by
Congress-a single, national body acting definitively at one moment in time-
fails to give adequate respect to the complexity and diversity of the moral
perspectives at stake. Unlike other morally contentious matters, cloning research
presents no obvious need for the adoption of a singleminded national resolution
of whether reproductive or research cloning should go forward. Notwithstanding
that some people would prefer a uniform national resolution either for or against
cloning, the fact is that local variations on this issue are conceivable-and the
Court should seize on this fact in order to promote the democratic values of
pluralism.
This issue should be conclusively resolved only by successive actions of
state legislatures, necessarily deliberating at different times and responding to
different constellations of constituents. This institutional deliberative structure is
not only best suited to the specific character of these moral issues, but it is also,
and most importantly, a respectful recognition of the diverse character of
American society. It may be that, notwithstanding this diversity, a nationally
uniform moral position will emerge regarding the moral status of cloning,
particularly given recent political events.38 But we can most reliably assure
36. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
37. Id. at 23.
38. See supra notes 5-6.
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adequate respect for the currently diverse moral perspectives on this issue by
insisting on a multiplicity of deliberative sites and occasions as a requisite path
toward the forging of any uniform national view. The actions by various state
governments to fund embryonic stem cell research 39 exemplify the workings of a
democratic, deliberative process. 40 A blanket Congressional prohibition on such
research would dishonor this process. Accordingly, the present and any future
Congress should restrain itself or be restrained by the Constitution.
39. See, e.g., James W. Fossett, Beyond the Low-Hanging Fruit: Stem Cell Research Policy in
an Obama Administration, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 523 (2009); Kaiser Family
Foundation, State Funding of Embryonic & Fetal Research as of January, 2008,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=l 12&cat=-2 (last visited Mar. 25, 2009); Joe
Palca, States Take Lead in Funding Stem-Cell Research (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 30,
2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9244363.
40. See Gretchen Ruethling, Illinois To Pay for Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at
A17.
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